Business Group Affiliation, Performance, Context, and Strategy: A Meta-analysis by Carney, Michael et al.




Final version: http://amj.aom.org/content/54/3/437.short 
 
Michael Carney 




Eric R. Gedajlovic 
Faculty of Business Administration 
Simon Fraser University 
erg@sfu.ca 
 
Pursey P. M. A. R. Heugens 




Marc van Essen 




J. (Hans) van Oosterhout 
Rotterdam School of Management 
Erasmus University 
joosterhout@rsm.nl 
                                                 
*
 We thank AMJ Associate Editor Gerry Sanders and three anonymous reviewers for their guidance and support. 
Tammo Bijmolt, Chris Doucouliagos, and Inge Geyskens provided useful suggestions for dealing with publication 
outlet quality variability and sample overlap issues. Nico Dewaelheyns, Sandra Dow, Niels Hermes, Woochan 
Kim, Robert Lensink, Ronny Manos, Claudio Piga, and Michael Sullivan sent us additional primary studies. Any 
remaining mistakes are our own. 




Research on business groups – legally independent firms tied together in a variety of formal and 
informal ways – is accelerating. Through meta-analytical techniques employed on a database of 
141 studies covering 28 different countries, we synthesize this research and extend it by testing 
several new hypotheses. We find that affiliation diminishes firm performance in general, but also 
that affiliates are comparatively better off in contexts with underdeveloped financial and labor 
market institutions. We also trace the affiliation discount to specific strategic actions taken at the 
firm and group levels. Overall, our results indicate that affiliate performance reflects complex 







The past decade has witnessed a surge in research regarding the performance of business groups 
(BGs), which Khanna and Rivkin (2001) define as “firms which though legally independent, are 
bound together by a constellation of formal and informal ties and are accustomed to taking 
coordinated action” (p. 47). Three points of consensus are apparent in this body of work. First, 
BGs are ubiquitous in many countries with types such as Japanese Keiretsus and Zaibatsu 
(Gerlach, 1992), South Korean Chaebols (Chang, 2003), Latin America’s Grupos Economicos 
(Strachan, 1976), Hong Kong’s Hongs (Wong, 1996), India’s Business Houses (Encarnation, 
1989), Taiwan’s Guanxiqiye (Numazaki, 1996), Russia’s Oligarchs (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001) and 
China’s Qiye Jituan (Keister, 2000) becoming emblematic of their nation’s enterprise systems. 
  A second area of consensus is that BGs are structurally different from conglomerate 
organizations, described by Williamson as H- and M-forms (Williamson, 1975). While 
coordination in conglomerates takes place through the unified internal control of a portfolio of 
firms (Davis, Diekman, & Tinsley, 1994), coordination in BGs relies on a more complex web of 
mechanisms, such as multiple and reciprocated equity, debt, and commercial ties (Gerlach, 1992) 
and kinship affiliation between top managers (Granovetter, 2005).   
A third widely held position is that BGs owe their predominance in many countries to the 
existence of market failures and poor-quality legal and regulatory institutions (Granovetter, 
2005). In this view, BG formation has taken place in these contexts in order to internalize 
transactions in the absence of reliable trading partners or legal safeguards to guarantee 
transactions between unaffiliated firms (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Leff, 1978).  
  Despite these points of consensus, disagreement fueled by ambiguous research findings is 
apparent over the general question of whether or not the net economic and social effects of BGs 
are positive (Fisman & Khanna, 2004; Keister, 2000). Such disagreement is evident in 
characterizations of BGs by scholars as either ‘heroes or villains’ (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 
2000a), ‘paragons or parasites’ (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007), ‘red barons or robbers barons’ (Perotti 
& Gelfer, 2001), or ‘anachronisms or avatars’ (Granovetter, 2005). Specifically, a lack of 
consensus exists on four key issues regarding BG performance and strategies.  
  First, researchers are divided regarding the performance implications of BG affiliation 
(Claessens, Fan, & Lang, 2006; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). While some scholars theorize that the 
net effect of affiliation on profits is positive, others argue that it is negative for some or all firms, 
and each can point to empirical support for their positions. Researchers using exchange theory 
(Keister, 2001), transaction cost analysis (Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004), and 
the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Guillén, 2000) find that affiliation enhances 
performance (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Chang & Hong, 2000). Yet others have found that 
these potential advantages are often not realized due to various offsetting costs of affiliation 
(Claessens et al., 2006; Lee, Peng, & Lee, 2008). A third group of scholars have found that the 
relationship between affiliation and performance is not universal, and that some firms within a 
BG benefit at the expense of others (Bertrand, Mehta, & Mullainathan, 2002; Khanna & Yafeh, 
2005). The effect of affiliation on performance therefore remains an open question. 
  Second, uncertainty also exists regarding the institution-level variables which moderate 
the affiliation–performance relationship. The prevailing viewpoint is that BG affiliation benefits 
firms most in developing contexts characterized by voids in hard (i.e. telecommunication and 
transportation) and soft infrastructure (i.e. legal and financial systems) (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Fisman & Khanna, 2004), but the evidence on this point is inconclusive. In a study of BG 
affiliation in fourteen emerging economies, Khanna and Rivkin (2001) find that affiliation is 
beneficial in six countries, detrimental in three others, and ineffectual in the remaining five. They 
conclude that the performance effects of BG affiliation “resist any simple normative 
categorization” (p. 68) and that a definitive understanding of their effects in various national 
contexts “must await further data collection and empirical inquiry” (p. 68).  
   Third, while many studies have examined the performance consequences of affiliation, 
there is a shortage of research examining the strategies of BG affiliates. As a result, there is little 
evidence on the issues of whether the strategies of affiliate firms are different from non-affiliated 
firms, and if so, whether these distinctive strategies affect the relationship between affiliation and 
financial performance. A clearer understanding of affiliate strategic behavior may therefore shed 
new light on the ambiguous findings regarding the profit impact of BG affiliation.  
    Fourth, the evidence concerning BG performance has primarily been drawn from studies 
at the affiliate rather than the group level (but see: Chang & Hong, 2002; Luo & Chung, 2005; 
Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004). This is concerning because some of the main theoretical arguments 
suggesting superior BG performance emphasize their aggregate scale and scope efficiencies. For 
instance, it is widely argued that the performance advantages of BGs are a function of their 
market power and capacity to wield political influence (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; 
Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000b). Similarly, Khanna and Palepu’s core argument also 
pertains to the group level of analysis, as the success of BGs in emerging markets is attributed to 
their ability to mimic market institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 1999, 2000b). Thus, there appears 
to be a disconnect in the BG literature between theories which emphasize group-level 
phenomena and empirical studies which examine performance at the affiliate level.  
In short, in reviewing the literature we find that there is broad agreement among scholars 
that BGs are a phenomenon of great theoretical and practical import, but also important points of 
contention and ambiguity regarding their financial performance and strategies. The purpose of 
this study is to shed new light on these areas of dissensus with the help of several meta-analytic 
techniques. As noted by Eden (2002), meta-analyses are useful in addressing open research 
questions with data that are closer to definitive than those reported in any single primary study. 
As a point of departure, we perform such a research-synthesizing meta-analysis to examine the 
mixed empirical findings in the BG literature on the performance effects of affiliation. However, 
both Eden (2002) and Combs, Ketchen, Crook, and Roth (2010) point out that meta-analyses are 
also a useful theory-extension tool. We therefore also employ a set of more advanced meta-
analytic techniques to evaluate several hypotheses that are difficult to assess in single-sample 
primary studies and have thus far eluded empirical scrutiny. These theory-extending hypotheses 
examine both moderating effects of institutional variables and mediating effects of affiliate- and 
group-level strategy variables on which the existing BG literature is largely silent.   
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Performance Effects of Business Group Affiliation  
To explain their prevalence in different host societies, researchers adopting various theoretical 
perspectives have argued that BG ties have performance-enhancing benefits for affiliates (Yiu, 
Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). Taking up the theme of BGs as a response to market failures, 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) have reasoned that affiliation benefits firms because BGs function 
as efficient internal capital and labor markets and as an intermediary organizational form capable 
of mobilizing valued resources. Guillén (2000) argues that the recurring transactions between 
BG affiliates lead to richer flows of information that improve resource allocation and allow 
affiliates to acquire financial resources on favorable terms. Similarly, transaction cost theorists 
argue that scarce skilled labor and managerial talent can be developed and shared across affiliate 
firms more efficiently due to transaction recurrence (Chang & Choi, 1988; Chang & Hong, 2000).   
   Adopting a social network perspective, other scholars have emphasized benefits arising 
from enduring and multiplicitous relations between BG affiliates (Gerlach, 1992; Granovetter, 
2005). They argue that network embeddedness provides firms with rich formal and tacit 
information about each other, which offers benefits in terms of uncertainty reduction, contract 
enforcement, and opportunity identification (Granovetter, 2005). Gerlach (1992) and Keister 
(1998) reason that BGs reduce uncertainty for affiliates through the coordination of investment 
decisions and by providing assurances about the supply of intermediate goods. Weidenbaum and 
Hughes (1996) attribute the success of BGs to their informal contract enforcement capacities 
with regard to credit granting and joint venture participation. Luo and Chung (2005) emphasize 
that ongoing relations provide a conduit for the dissemination of timely information about 
market and technological developments that may form the basis for new business opportunities.    
But other scholars argue that BGs do not exist to improve affiliate profitability (Kim, 
Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Agency theorists see BGs as fraught with 
agency costs (Morck et al., 2005) and as instruments used by wealthy families to appropriate 
private benefits through a variety of tactics. These include ‘pyramiding’ – the control of many 
businesses with limited capital investments through a set of cascading parent-affiliate 
relationships (Claessens et al., 2000b) and ‘tunneling’ – a process where dominant shareholders 
transfer assets or profits from peripheral to core firms in which they hold relatively greater equity 
ownership (Friedman, Johnson, & Mitton, 2003). Others suggest that BGs promote the stability 
rather than the maximization of returns (Gerlach, 1992). In this view, BGs serve as an insurance 
policy that reduces bankruptcy risk for affiliates, but also imposes costs or ‘taxes’ on members 
(Ferris, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2003), such as the obligation to prop up weaker partners (Morck 
& Nakamura, 1999). Reflecting this dissensus, we propose two competing hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Business group affiliation is positively related to a firm’s financial performance.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Business group affiliation is negatively related to a firm’s financial performance.  
  
The Moderating Role of Institutional Context  
Broad agreement exists that BGs emerged as a response to underdeveloped institutions or 
‘institutional voids’ (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) in developing economies, and that BG ties are 
beneficial in societies where such voids continue to exist (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002). The 
institutional voids thesis states that BGs internalize activities that otherwise fail to materialize 
due to limitations in a society’s financial, legal, and labor market institutions, which jeopardize 
the exchange of products and services between arm’s length transactors (Leff, 1978). In such 
contexts, BG ties are beneficial because they provide a safe haven from institutional voids and 
offer access to resources that are unavailable to unaffiliated firms (Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  
   While theoretical support for the institutional voids thesis is widespread, less agreement 
exists about the relative importance of different types of voids. While some scholars focus 
primarily on deficiencies in financial systems, others emphasize the importance of deficiencies in 
legal or labor market institutions. Among the former, BGs are viewed as relatively efficient 
internal capital markets (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006) that remedy impediments to economic 
growth for their affiliates, such as illiquid equity markets, limited disclosure, and the absence of 
market intermediaries (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). This view is supported by studies 
documenting the reliance of affiliates on group-specific financial institutions (Keister, 1998; 
Weinstein & Yafeh, 1998) and those exploring how BGs transfer financial resources from cash 
rich to financially constrained affiliates (Lee et al., 2008; Lins & Servaes, 2002).  
     Others have focused on deficiencies in legal institutions, which make formal contracts 
difficult to enforce and the exchange of products and services prone to opportunism (Hoskisson, 
Canella, Tihanyi, & Faraci, 2004). In this view, BGs serve as a haven where contracts are more 
easily enforced and the risk of opportunism is limited. Evidence supporting this view comes 
from researchers describing how transaction recurrence among BG affiliates provides rich 
information flows, reputation effects, and informal contract enforcement mechanisms which curb 
opportunism (Berglöf & Perotti, 1994; Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997).   
   Lastly, another group of scholars highlight the roles played by BGs in societies where 
there are weaknesses in institutions supporting the development of human capital such as 
deficient general, technical, and professional schools, which can lead to acute labor shortages 
(Fisman & Khanna, 2004). In these contexts, BGs may alleviate shortages by functioning as 
internal labor markets, investing in training and development (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a; Lincoln 
& Gerlach, 2004) and dispatching scarce talent to needy affiliates (Lincoln & Gerlach, 2004). 
Conceptually, institutional voids are best thought of as moderating variables affecting the 
relationship between affiliation and performance. Institutional voids theory (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997, 2000a) suggests that financial, legal, and human resource voids will not influence all firms 
equally. Rather, such voids impose a stronger negative performance effect on standalone firms 
due to the various benefits affiliates receive, such as the mutual assistance that group members 
can offer one another. The relationship between affiliation and firm performance is therefore 
expected to become stronger in a positive direction as institutional voids increase in magnitude. 
The following three hypotheses capture these moderation effects:  
Hypothesis 2a: The associational strength of the relationship between business group affiliation 
and financial performance is positively moderated by the existence of weak financial 
infrastructure.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: The associational strength of the relationship between business group affiliation 
and financial performance is positively moderated by the existence of weak legal institutions.  
 
Hypothesis 2c: The associational strength of the relationship between business group affiliation 
and financial performance is positively moderated by the existence of weak labor market 
institutions.  
 
The Mediating Role of Organizational Strategy  
Whereas many scholars have examined the affiliation-performance relationship, only few have 
looked at the effects of affiliation on firm strategy (e.g. Colpan, 2006; Lamin, 2006), and none 
have examined the mediating role that strategy plays in the focal relationship. Consequently, the 
literature is largely silent on the important questions of whether BG affiliates make distinctive 
strategic choices, and if so, whether these choices explain performance differences between 
affiliated and non-affiliated firms. Yet affiliates’ strategies are likely to differ from those of 
standalone firms on at least three dimensions: leverage, diversification, and internationalization. 
We expect these strategic choices to reflect a wider set of motives than profit maximization alone, 
such that affiliates may face a performance discount relative to unaffiliated firms. 
    Leverage. Four streams of literature suggest that BG affiliates make greater use of debt 
financing than non-affiliates. First, agency theorists argue that affiliates’ majority shareholders 
prefer to finance operations through debt rather than issuing new equity, which dilutes their 
effective control (Berglöf & Perotti, 1994). Second, the internal capital markets thesis suggests 
that affiliates are more leveraged because they have access to sources of debt unavailable to non-
affiliates (Keister, 2001). Third, norms of mutual assistance that other researchers have described 
as emblematic of BG affiliation may function as an “insurance policy” (Lincoln, Gerlach, & 
Ahmadjian, 1996), lessening bankruptcy risk and promoting leverage. Fourth, the thick web of 
information connecting affiliates facilitates monitoring and the detection of default risk, making 
the intra-group provision of debt less risky for lenders (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). 
 While there are no studies investigating the performance consequences of debt-reliant 
financial strategies in the context of BGs, there may be a bias among BG affiliates to invest in 
too many projects or in projects of the wrong type, as both privileged access to debt and the 
coinsurance effect of affiliation may promote unwieldy growth (Whited, 2001). Similarly, both 
the group norms described by sociologists (e.g. Gerlach, 1992) pertaining to the expectation of 
supporting fellow affiliates and the majority shareholder entrenchment effect described by 
agency theorists (Faccio, Young, & Lang, 2001) suggest that debt financing may be used to fund 
projects for reasons other than profit maximization. Higher leverage by BG affiliates is therefore 
expected to lead to lower performance relative to standalone firms. 
Diversification. We expect BG affiliates to engage in more unrelated diversification than 
other firms for three reasons. First, agency theorists suggest that many investments by BGs and 
their affiliates are driven more by controlling shareholders’ attempts to appropriate wealth 
through pyramiding and tunneling than by the profit potential of these investments (Bertrand et 
al., 2002; Friedman et al., 2003). Second, the availability of financing from a group’s internal 
capital market insulates the firm from external scrutiny and capital market pressures that 
constrain unrelated diversification in public corporations (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Keister, 
2001). Third, sociological perspectives suggest that the investment activity of affiliates is driven 
more by the needs of the group than by their own requirements, leading to their involvement in 
activities that unaffiliated firms would not take part in (McGuire & Dow, 2009). Given the 
significant bureaucratic and coordination costs associated with the management of diverse 
operations (Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, & White, 2005), we expect that these tendencies 
toward unrelated diversification will negatively influence affiliate-level financial performance. 
Internationalization. The literature suggests three reasons for a less pronounced 
international orientation amongst BG affiliates relative to non-affiliated firms (Colpan, 2006; 
Lamin, 2006; Hundley & Jacobson, 1998). First, the specialized services that BGs provide to 
remedy the institutional voids of their home countries may be more valuable domestically then 
abroad. Second, many of the potential benefits of affiliation are grounded in the group’s network 
of social and economic ties (Lamin, 2006). As such network benefits are strongest in a firm’s 
home market, they may result in a more domestic orientation among BG affiliates. Third, social 
norms in many BGs dictate that firms should first look amongst other affiliates for possible buy-
and-supply relationships before approaching non-group members, which may engender 
“complacency and a reduced incentive to export” (Hundley & Jacobson, 1998: 935). 
Even though BG affiliates enjoy advantages in accessible financial resources (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997; Guillén, 2000), their preferences for domestic projects may lead them to pass on 
international opportunities which are viewed as profitable by unaffiliated firms. That is, 
unconstrained by the social-structural forces and behavioral norms associated with group 
membership, unaffiliated firms can more readily exploit international projects, allowing them to 
more freely tap into new markets and leverage their existing capabilities. Conversely, the 
domestic orientation of BG affiliates may lead to performance lagging that of standalone firms.  
   In sum, multiple theoretical perspectives suggest that the strategies of BG affiliates will 
differ from non-affiliates, explaining some of the performance differentials between them. These 
views are expressed in the following hypothesis: 
 
 Hypothesis 3: The relationship between business group affiliation and affiliate financial 
performance is mediated by the unique financing, diversification, and internationalization 
strategies of business group affiliates.  
 
Group-Level Performance Effects.  
Our focus thus far has been on the strategic and performance consequences of group membership 
for BG affiliates rather than on the performance of the group as a whole. This affiliate-level 
focus is dominant in empirical BG work. We reason that the relative inattention paid to group-
level effects is related to difficulties associated with developing a sufficiently large sample of 
BGs in any single primary study. Such pragmatic considerations have led to a disconnect 
between theoretical work on BGs, which focuses on group-level processes such as the ability to 
amass market power and perform intermediating functions, and empirical work, which examines 
such processes using affiliate-level data. The meta-analytic nature of our study allows us to 
surmount such data availability problems related to the evaluation of group-level processes.  
BG size is widely viewed as an important factor explaining group performance, but 
researchers have offered very different explanations regarding why size matters. In our treatment 
of BG size, we strive for greater precision by explicitly distinguishing between the related effects 
of scale and scope on BG performance. By making this distinction, we are able to consider how 
and why BGs grow and also differentiate between various processes linking BG size to 
performance outcomes. In doing so, we account for the possibility that BG scale and BG scope 
have differing effects on group-level performance.  
 It is widely believed that BGs of a larger scale enjoy performance enhancing advantages 
relative to smaller groups (Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). There is a strong impetus for 
sales and asset growth in BGs for a number of reasons. First, larger BGs can benefit from 
economies of scale, allowing them to more cost-effectively carry out value-creating 
intermediating functions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a), such as administrative and project 
management activities (Amsden & Hikino, 1994). Second, increased scale may afford BGs 
reputation-enhancing effects. For instance, Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) argue that 
larger BGs may benefit from a reputation for fair dealing with business partners, and Khanna and 
Palepu (2000b) reason that reputation effects provide larger BGs with superior access to foreign 
capital and technological resources. Third, increased scale can provide BGs with a variety of 
benefits tied to enhanced market (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Mackie, 1992; Yoshihara, 1988) and 
political power (Carney, 2004; Claessens et al., 2000a; Dielemans & Sachs, 2008). For these 
reasons, we hypothesize that BG scale is positively related to group-level performance. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Business group operational scale is positively related to business group financial 
performance.  
 
 While the arguments summarized in relation to Hypothesis 4a suggest there is a strong 
impetus for sales and asset growth in BGs, they do not distinguish between the various types of 
activities that may be pursued to achieve that greater scale. At a fundamental level, like 
executives elsewhere, BG managers face decisions regarding whether to grow their operations by 
increasing their commitment to existing product markets, or by expanding the scope of their 
activities by entering new lines of business. In this respect, the literature suggests that the pull 
towards increasing size through growth in the scope of activities will be especially strong in BGs 
because of the types of leverageable resources they control, as well as the nature of the new 
business opportunities available to them (Guillén, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; Kock & 
Guillén, 2001). For example, Chang and Hong (2000) reason that the types of assets available to 
BGs allow them to assemble the resources necessary to take advantage of diverse business 
opportunities and Luo and Chung (2005) similarly contend that network embeddedness within 
BGs provides a conduit for timely information exchange, leading to the pursuit of diverse 
business opportunities.  
 Thus, researchers generally agree that growth in BGs tends to be manifested in activities 
that increase the scope of a group’s operations and several streams of research have theorized 
about the performance effects of such increased scope. Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi, and White 
(2005) contend that broader scope in BGs leads to performance-impairing challenges related to 
bureaucratic and coordination costs associated with the management of increasingly complex 
groups. Others, however, see the effects of increased BG scope in a more favorable light and 
argue that it can actually be profit enhancing. In particular, proponents of the institutional voids 
thesis suggest that broader scope allows BGs to perform interstitial functions and provide 
resources and support for their various businesses. Khanna and Palepu (1997), for example, 
argue that greater scope enables BGs to function effectively where reliable trading partners are 
unavailable, as it addresses their need for complimentary products and services.  
The preceding discussion suggests that the impetus for sales and asset growth in BGs (cf. 
Hypothesis 4a) tends to manifest itself in the form of performance impacting activities that 
increase group scope. Consequently, we hypothesize that BG scope mediates the relationship 
between BG scale and BG performance.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: Business group operational scope mediates the relationship between business 




Sample and Coding 
To identify relevant studies, we used five complementary search strategies (Heugens, van Essen, 
& van Oosterhout, 2009). First, we consulted several review articles (e.g. Carney, 2008; Khanna 
& Yafeh, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007). Second, we explored five electronic databases: (1) 
ABI/INFORM Global, (2) EconLit, (3) Google Scholar, (4) JSTOR, and (5) SSRN, using the 
following search terms: “business group,” “business houses,” “chaebol,” “grupos economicos,” 
“guanxiqiye,” “hongs,” “keiretsu,” “oligarchs,” “pyramids,” “qiye jituan”, and “zaibatsu”. Third, 
we manually searched 25 scholarly journals, including Academy of Management Journal, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Finance, Journal 
of International Business Studies, and Strategic Management Journal. Fourth, we explored the 
reference lists of all identified articles and traced all sources citing them using Google Scholar 
and ISI Web of Knowledge. Fifth, we corresponded with 54 authors of BG papers with missing 
effect size information, asking them for a correlation table. These efforts yielded a sample of 141 
primary studies, consisting of 102 published and 39 unpublished studies (see Appendix A).  
 We then read all the articles and developed a coding protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001) 
for extracting data on all relevant variables. To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we collected effect 
size information for the relationship between BG affiliation and firm performance, as well as 
sample size information. To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, we collected covariates from 
secondary sources. For testing Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b, we collected effect size information for 
interrelationships between all dependent, independent, and control variables in our analyses.  
 
HOMA Procedure 
We used HOMA to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b. HOMA refers to a set of statistical procedures for 
calculating meta-analytic mean correlations and corresponding confidence intervals (Hedges & 
Olkin, 1985; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). HOMA inputs are effect sizes capturing the strength of the 
focal relationship in a given sample, such as the Pearson product-moment correlation r or the 
partial correlation coefficient rxy.z. In this study we rely on both r and rxy.z. We use r because it is 
a widely published effect size statistic in management. Yet r is a bivariate measure of association, 
which ignores the effect of other variables that are often used as controls in multivariate 
investigations of the focal relationship. We therefore also use rxy.z., which can be computed 
directly from regression tables (Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2008). In our case, rxy.z captures the 
association between BG affiliation (X) and affiliate performance (Y), given a set of n controlling 
variables (Z).
† The z-vector typically contains control variables like firm size, age, and risk.  
                                                 
†
 Partial correlations are computed as follows: √(t2/ (t2+df)), where t is the t-statistic and df is degrees of freedom. As 
this will always produce a positive number, it is necessary to convert it to a negative number if the regression 
coefficient is negative (see: Greene, 2008, Chapter 3). t-values result from the scaling of primary coefficients by 
their respective standard errors. They are by definition standardized and defined on a dimensionless scale. 
When studies reported effect size statistics other than r or rxy.z, such as Cohen’s d, we 
converted these to an r value (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). When multiple measurements of the 
focal effect were reported, we included them all in our analyses, as Monte Carlo simulations 
show that procedures using the complete set of measurements outperform those representing 
each study by a single value in areas like parameter significance testing and parameter estimation 
accuracy (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001). Since HOMA procedures assume that effect sizes are 
normally distributed, we used Fisher’s (1928) Zr-transformation to correct for skewness in the 
effect size distribution (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). In line with current conventions, we used 
random-effects HOMA for combining study estimates (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp, & 
Cunha, 2009; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To estimate mean effects appropriately, differences in 
precision across effect sizes have to be accounted for, so we weighted them by their inverse 
variance weight w (Hedges & Olkin, 1985): the inverse of their squared standard error.‡ We also 
used these weights to calculate the standard error of the mean effect and its confidence interval.§  
 
 
                                                 
‡
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MARA Procedure 
To test Hypotheses 2a through 2c we used MARA (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001), a special type of 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression analysis, designed to assess the relationship between 
effect size and moderator variables by modeling heterogeneity in the effect size distribution 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). In MARA, effect sizes are weighted by w to account for differences in 
precision (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). MARA is a modified type of WLS regression, which prevents 
statistical analysis programs from interpreting these weights as “representing multiple effect 
sizes rather than weightings of single effect sizes” (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001: 122). As scholars are 
concerned about the inaccuracy of fixed-effects models (Geyskens et al., 2009), we use a more 
conservative mixed-effects specification, which attributes effect size variability to systematic 
between-study differences, firm-level sampling error, and an unmeasured random component 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The moderator variables we use capture aspects of the institutional 
context from which effect sizes were drawn as well as methodological study characteristics. 
To test the moderating effects of local institutions, we collected data from additional 
sources and employed them in conjunction with those obtained from the primary studies. We 
used two variables to assess the impact of financial infrastructure (Hypothesis 2a). The 
availability of equity capital was measured by dividing each country’s total stock market 
capitalization by its gross domestic product. Ease of obtaining debt financing was taken from the 
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook. Three variables were used to capture the effects of legal 
institutions (Hypothesis 2b). To measure the overall quality of legal institutions, we used 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s (2005) ‘rule of law’ measure. We assessed the level of legal 
protection against self-dealing with Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer’s (2008) 
‘anti-self-dealing index.’ To measure the efficiency of the legal system in resolving commercial 
disputes, we used the Doing Business (World Bank) ‘enforcing contracts’ indicator. We utilized 
four variables to measure the effect of labor market institutions (Hypothesis 2c). We used World 
Development Indicator (World Bank) data to assess the general education level. To measure the 
availability of professionally trained managers, we created a new variable by counting the 
number of the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) accredited 
business schools in each country (AACSB membership data). To assess the quality of these 
schools, we consulted the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum). The same 
report also provided a measure capturing overall labor market competitiveness.  
We also employed seven control variables to establish the robustness of our hypothesis 
tests. First, we used a dummy variable capturing whether particular effect sizes were derived 
from published (‘1’) or unpublished (‘0’) studies. Second, a dummy variable indicating whether 
a study utilized cross-sectional (‘1’) or longitudinal (‘0’) data was used. Third, to account for 
differences in journal quality, we controlled for impact factor (ISI Web of Knowledge
sm
) of the 
publication outlet, assigning a value of ‘0’ to unpublished or non-ISI sources and the actual 
impact factor otherwise. Fourth, to control for potential time-dependence (cf. Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007), we coded the year of data collection for each effect size, taking the median sampling year 
for longitudinal designs. Fifth, to control for voids in physical infrastructure (cf. Fisman & 
Khanna, 2004), we compiled a new composite index based on five indicators related to 
‘railroads,’ ‘ports,’ ‘air transport,’ ‘electricity supply,’ and ‘phone lines’ from the Global 
Competitiveness Report. Sixth, to control for the high proportion of Japanese data in the primary 
studies, we used a dummy variable segregating Japanese (‘1’) from other (‘0’) effect sizes. 
Seventh, to control for (partial) overlap in sampling time frames across studies, we included 
dummy variables for each set of studies relying on similar data. 
MASEM Procedure 
To test Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b, we used MASEM (Cheung & Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran & 
Ones, 1995), which uses a two-stage procedure. First, mean correlations between variables of 
interest are established through separate HOMA analyses. Second, structural equations modeling 
is applied on the matrix of mean correlations, using maximum likelihood modeling routines 
(Cheung & Chan, 2005). MASEM has two advantages over other meta-analytic techniques. First, 
not all relationships specified by the theory under investigation need to be included in each 
primary study, as each cell in the data matrix represents a different subset of all included studies 
(Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). Second, MASEM can be used to test previously untested research 
hypotheses, especially those such as Hypotheses 3, 4a, and 4b, which stipulate mediating 
relationships connecting two previously unlinked literatures (Eden, 2002).  
Testing Hypothesis 3 requires us to assess: (a) the direct effect of BG affiliation on firm 
performance; (b) the effect of affiliation on firms’ revealed strategy choices; and (c) the 
consequences of these choices for firm performance. The included strategic choice variables are: 
leverage (ratio of total debts to total assets), diversification (Herfindahl or entropy measure 
capturing presence in multiple business segments), and internationalization (ratio of exports to 
total sales). We also control for the influence of firm size (total assets, sales, or employees) and 
firm age (years since founding) on strategy choices, and of firm risk (volatility of returns) and 
R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales) on affiliate performance. Due to the 
potential endogeneity of firms’ strategy and affiliation choices on performance (cf. Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997), independent tests of these effects could introduce biased estimates. We therefore 
tested the following system of simultaneous equations: 
 
 (1) Diversification = β1 affiliation + β2 size + β3 age + ε 
(2) Internationalization = β4 affiliation + β5 size + β6 age + ε 
(3) Leverage = β7 affiliation + β8 size + β9 age + ε 
(4) Performance = β10 affiliation + β11 risk + β12 research & development + β13 diversification + 
β14 internationalization + β15 leverage + ε 
 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b call for a test of: (a) the direct effect of BG scale on BG 
performance; (b) the effect of BG scale on BG scope; and (c) the influence of BG scope on BG 
performance. BG scale is measured as the sum of assets, sales, or employees across all affiliates; 
BG scope as a Herfindahl index or entropy measure capturing BG presence in multiple business 
segments. We also control for the influence of group leverage, R&D intensity, and risk on BG 
performance. Due to the potential endogeneity of BG scale and BG scope on BG performance, 
biased estimates could result from independent tests of these effects (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b; 
Kock & Guillén, 2001). We therefore evaluated the following simultaneous equations: 
 
(1) Scope = β1 scale + ε 
(2) Performance = β2 scale + β3 scope + β4 leverage + β5 research & development + β6 risk + ε 
 
Both systems of equations were estimated on firm- and group-level meta-analytic correlation 
matrices, using the full information maximum likelihood method in LISREL 8.80. To deal with 
sample size differences across the correlation coefficients comprising these matrices, we based 




Firm-Level Bivariate and Partial Correlations 
Tables 1 and 2 show that Hypothesis 1a should be rejected in favor of Hypothesis 1b: the mean 
correlation of the focal relationship is -.02 for both the bivariate (k = 284) and partial correlation 
(k = 50) HOMAs. As the confidence intervals do not include zero, the effects are significant.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Three caveats apply, however. First, the control group of unaffiliated firms is not identical to the 
treatment group in terms of either prevalence or size. Across all included studies, affiliated firms 
represent 34 percent of the sample (see Table 3). Furthermore, a HOMA on the relationship 
between BG affiliation and firm size yields a strong correlation (.26; k = 164), so we control for 
size in all firm-level analyses. Second, the results in Table 1 suggest that the strength of the focal 
relationship is driven by the chosen performance measure. Affiliation is negatively related to 
accounting performance (-.03; see Table 1), implying that affiliates are less profitable than stand-
alone firms. On the other hand, tests using market-based measures of performance reveal no 
significant effect (-.01, n.s.). Third, the mean effects we found are small by conventional 
standards (Cohen, 1977), implying that the effect of affiliation is modest. Furthermore, the 
amount of (true) heterogeneity present in both effect size distributions is substantial (r-based: Q 
= 5,805.29; p < .01; I
2
 = .95; rxy.z-based: Q = 252.36; p < .01; I
2
 = .80). Under these conditions, 
mean effects are best interpreted as an average rather than a common true correlation value 
(Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 235), implying that further moderator analyses are warranted. 
 We also conducted three robustness checks. First, the primary studies in our sample 
derive from journals of varying status. To control for these differences, we ran separate r-based 
HOMAs on effect sizes derived from: published studies (k = 180), journals with an editorial team 
dominated by US- or Western Europe-based scholars (k = 173),** peer reviewed publications (k = 
159), journals included in the ISI Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) in 2008 (k = 123), 
journals continuously included in SSCI from 2004 – 2008 (k = 118), journals with an SSCI 
impact factor greater than > 1.0 (k = 109), and the 10 journals in our dataset with the highest 
five-year SSCI Impact Factors (k = 44). All mean correlations are significant and between -.02 
and -.03, suggesting that publication outlet quality does not moderate the focal relationship. 
Second, some of the samples in our analysis overlap in terms of included firms and time 
periods, which could result in similar correlation structures between same-country samples. We 
used several checks to diagnose the severity of this ‘drinking from the same well’ problem. In a 
separate HOMA, we included only the largest non-overlapping samples per country (k = 51). At 
-.04, this result is materially similar to the overall mean correlation. We also ran two separate 
MARAs (see Table 4): one with dummy variables for each set of overlapping samples (Model 1), 
and another in which other control variables were also included (Model 2). In both cases, the 
model constant (i.e., the control variable-adjusted mean correlation) was -.03. Two z-tests for 
meta-analytic mean differences (Feingold, 1992) corroborate that the corrected and uncorrected 
mean correlations are not significantly different (see Table 4). In short, the ‘drinking from the 
same well’ issue does not appear to affect our results.  
 Third, because BGs are prominent in Asia, we assessed whether the financial crisis that 
struck that continent in 1997-1998 (Mitton, 2002) affected our findings. We split our sample into 
four sub-groups: observations from the pre-crisis period (prior to 1996); the crisis period (1997 
                                                 
**
 This distinction was suggested by one of our reviewers.  
and 1998); the post-crisis period (1999 and after); and the ‘mixed’ category of observations 
covering two or more of these periods. Separate r-based HOMAs show that our findings are 
robust against the effects of the crisis (pre-crisis: -.04, k = 105; crisis: -.02 (n.s.), k = 20; post-
crisis: -.02, k = 75; mixed: -.02; k = 84). 
 
Jurisdiction-Level Moderating Effects 
Table 3 reports country-specific r-based HOMA results. ††  The effect of affiliation on 
performance is positive in six countries: Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Sweden, and 
Turkey. It is negative in five others: France, Japan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and South Korea. No 
significant affiliation effect exists in seven other countries: Belgium, China, India, the 
Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, and Thailand. We could not estimate a separate mean effect for the 
remaining nine countries, due to a lack of observations. Table 4 shows three MARA models. 
Models 1 and 2 report results for data source quality and other controls. Model 3 reports results 
for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. Model 3 fits the data well (R
2
 = .28; Qmodel p < .01). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 & 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
The results support Hypothesis 2a. The development of a jurisdiction’s financial infrastructure, 
captured by debt availability and stock market capitalization, negatively moderates the affiliation 
effect. When external financing is not easily available, affiliation becomes relatively more 
advantageous because a BG’s internal capital market can be turned to for financing. Hypothesis 
2b is rejected. The quality of business-relevant legal institutions, as captured by the rule of law, 
                                                 
††
 One of the countries comprising our sample (Italy) is not included in Table 3, as we retrieved correlations between 
our independent (MASEM) variables for it, but not for the focal relationship. 
anti-self-dealing, and enforcing contracts variables, does not negatively moderate the focal 
relationship. In contrast, the rule of law index positively moderates it, indicating that without 
access to effective courts the performance of BG affiliates suffers. This suggests that inefficient 
resource allocation decisions caused by agency problems like tunneling or propping may more 
negatively impact firm performance in contexts with weak overall legal protection (Bae, Kang, 
& Kim, 2002; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000). Hypothesis 2c is supported. The 
quality of labor market institutions, as captured by general education level, and the business 
school count and quality variables, negatively moderates the focal relationship. BG affiliation is 
more advantageous in contexts characterized by labor market voids. No significant effect was 
found for overall labor market competitiveness, however, suggesting that groups are better at 
filling specific rather than generic voids.  
 Table 4 also reports control variable results. Publication status and research design did 
not moderate the focal effect. The significant negative effect for median sample year suggests 
that BG affiliation becomes less beneficial over time (cf. Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). Journal 
impact factor moderated the focal relationship negatively, implying a modest publication bias 
amongst more highly cited journals. Finally, the physical infrastructure variables were not 
significant, implying that BGs are not effective at filling ‘harder’ infrastructural voids. Finally, 
the Japan dummy has a significant negative moderating effect.  
 
Firm-level Mediating Effects 
Table 5 shows a firm-level meta-analytic correlation matrix. All 36 cells below the diagonal 
contain a separate meta-analysis, indicating both the mean effect and its standard deviation (s.d.ρ). 
Cells above the diagonal report the number of primary observations (N) and samples (k) on 
which the mean effect is based. For entries printed in bold, a significant Q-test indicates the 
presence of moderating variables, suggesting that the reported value is an average rather than a 
common true correlation value (Hedges & Olkin, 1985: 235).  
Table 6 presents firm-level MASEM results. MASEM addresses simultaneity issues with 
respect to affiliation and strategy choices and incorporates control variables. As such, it offers a 
more precise test of Hypothesis 3 than the bivariate analyses reported in Table 5. The model fits 
the data well (χ2 = 760.09; RMSR = .10; GFI = .98). Furthermore, all conditions for mediation 
are met (Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, BG affiliation significantly affects all three hypothesized 
mediators: diversification (β = .06), internationalization (β = -.09), and leverage (β = .05). 
Second, BG affiliation significantly affects firm performance in the absence of these mediators (-
.02; see Table 5). Third, two out of three mediators have a significant effect on firm performance: 
diversification (β = -.05), internationalization (β = .01; n.s.), and leverage (β = -.12). Fourth, the 
effect of affiliation on performance shrinks when the mediators are added to the model (to β = -
.01; n.s). Formal tests (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993) confirm that mediating variables carry the 
influence of BG affiliation to firm performance (Sobel test: z = 3.77; p < .01; Aroian test: z = 
3.75; p < .01; Goodman test: z = 3.80; p < .01). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported by the data. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 5 & 6 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Group-Level Mediating Effects  
Table 7 presents a group-level meta-analytic correlation matrix, consisting of 15 separate 
HOMAs. These results confirm Hypothesis 4a: BG scale has a significant positive effect on BG 
performance (.07). Table 8 shows the group-level MASEM results. This model fits the data well 
(χ2 = 172.10; RMSR = .02; GFI = .99), and all remaining conditions for mediation are met 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). First, BG scale has a substantial and significant positive effect on BG 
scope (β = .47). Second, BG scope has a significant unique effect on BG performance (β = -.13). 
Third, the positive effect of BG scale on BG performance increases when BG scope is added to 
the model (to β = .09). Formal tests (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993) confirm the mediating role of 
the BG scope variable (Sobel test: z = 15.26; p < .01; Aroian test: z = 15.26; p < .01; Goodman 
test: z = 15.27; p < .01), thereby supporting Hypothesis 4b. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 7 & 8 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
   
DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Scholars alternatively portray BGs as ‘heroes,’ ‘paragons,’ and ‘avatars,’ or as ‘villains,’ 
parasites,’ and ‘anachronisms’ (Claessens et al., 2000a; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007; Granovetter, 
2005). Our results show that such categorical classifications are unwarranted, and that their 
character is considerably more complex. Specifically, our study offers four substantive 
contributions to the BG literature, each of which nuances the dichotomous categorical schema 
through which scholars and policy makers have tended to approach BGs.  
First, we conducted a meta-analysis synthesizing all evidence on the effect of affiliation 
on performance (Geyskens et al., 2009). Whereas this effect is negative and significant, its 
magnitude (-.02) offers no grounds to discard BGs as a dysfunctional organizational form. 
Rather, our research synthesis shows that the performance implications of affiliation are very 
heterogeneous, and must be qualified by the moderating effects of institutional contingencies and 
the mediating effects of strategic actions taken by group- and affiliate-level managers.    
Second, we unpacked the notion of ‘institutional voids’ (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 2000b) 
by exploring the moderating effects of a broad set of theoretically derived institutional variables 
on the focal relationship. We revealed that affiliates perform relatively well in contexts 
characterized by ‘soft’ voids in labor and financial market institutions, but also that BGs add no 
value in contexts lacking ‘hard’ infrastructure and actually impair affiliate performance in 
settings with underdeveloped legal institutions. Scholars and policy makers therefore need to 
avoid labeling national contexts in terms like “developed,” “emerging,” and “developing,” and 
instead place greater emphasis on the varied effects played by different types of institutions.  
Third, we identified differences in the revealed strategic choices of BG affiliates (relative 
to non-affiliates) and assessed the performance implications of these choices. We found that 
affiliates tend to be more leveraged, diversified, and locally oriented than their standalone 
counterparts, which explains much of the performance discount they incur. These results both 
reveal previously unidentified strategic mediators (e.g. financing and product-market strategies) 
and point to the underexplored effect of managerial processes on affiliate performance.  
Fourth, we advanced prevailing theoretical accounts of the drivers of group-level 
performance (e.g. Chang & Hong, 2002; Luo & Chung, 2005; Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004). 
Whereas current theorizing often conflates various processes associated with BG size, we 
disentangle these into positive scale and negative scope effects. Owing to factors like size-related 
cost savings and increased market and political power, greater scale improves BG performance. 
However, greater scale also tends to broaden the operational scope of BGs which increases 
bureaucratic and control costs and negatively impacts their performance. Scope is therefore best 
seen as a mediator suppressing the otherwise positive effect of scale on group-level performance. 
 
Complexity and Nuance in the Affiliation-Performance Relationship 
Our analyses reveal a small but significant negative relationship between affiliation and 
performance (cf. Hypotheses 1a and 1b). This suggests that on average the costs of BG affiliation, 
such as the agency problems described by Morck and Yeung (2003) and the insurance premiums 
discussed by Lincoln, Gerlach, and Ahmadjian (1996), slightly outweigh benefits like access to 
internal capital markets and dispute resolution mechanisms (Chang & Hong, 2000; Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997). However, more striking than this modest negative relationship, is the 
heterogeneity of the focal effect illustrated by the considerable differences found in the direction 
and strength of the performance effect of affiliation across national contexts (Table 3).  
Thus, our findings indicate that BGs are highly variegated, complex phenomena, 
implying that nuanced methodologies and theories are necessary to bring their core attributes to 
light. In terms of methodologies, we advocate research designs adopting middle-range 
perspectives (Merton, 1968), centering on conceptual frameworks that are more generic than 
descriptive case studies of individual groups and their affiliates, but also more specific than 
universalistic approaches that treat all cases as essentially similar. For instance, future research 
may be usefully directed towards in-depth comparative studies explaining cross-national 
performance differentials (see Table 3). We expect that these differences can only partly be 
traced to variation in institutional development and that cross-country differences in the behavior 
of managerial actors will also prove to be an important driver of BG performance.   
The theoretical frameworks used to understand BG behavior will likewise have to evolve 
and become more nuanced. To date, most BG studies have employed mono-theoretical lenses 
such as agency theory (Morck & Yeung, 2003), transaction cost theory (Luo & Chung, 2005), 
exchange theory (Keister, 2001), and the RBV (Guillén, 2000). Whereas each of these theories 
offers a useful perspective on BG behavior and performance, none of them in isolation suffices 
to explain this complex and variegated organizational form. Therefore, we see a need for future 
studies offering concurrent tests of multiple theories, as well as studies developing and testing 
eclectic explanatory frameworks combining variables from multiple source theories. 
 
Local Institutions and the Institutional Voids Thesis 
Our meta-analytic approach allowed us to consider a more heterogeneous set of 28 jurisdictions 
than any previous study (e.g. Khanna & Rivkin, 2001) in assessing the moderating effects of 
institutions on the focal relationship. In addition to data obtained from earlier studies, we also 
collected data for 10 institutional variables pertaining to financial infrastructure as well as legal 
and labor market institutions. We thus considered a broader range of institutional-level variables 
than previous studies and explored their effects over a more inclusive set of national contexts. 
This allowed us to unpack the notion of “institutional voids,” which has emerged as a umbrella 
term for a nation’s stage of development (cf. Khanna & Palepu, 1997, Khanna & Palepu, 2000b), 
and our findings indicate that while some institutional-level factors moderate the focal 
relationship in the conventionally theorized direction, others do not.  
As suggested by the institutional voids thesis, we found that firms benefited from 
affiliation in contexts characterized by weak financial and labor market infrastructure 
(Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c). Yet, even though the view that affiliation benefits firms in contexts 
with weak legal safeguards is widely held (cf. Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006), we find little 
evidence for this position. While our results support the institutional voids thesis in general, they 
also suggest the need for researchers and practitioners to make finer-grained distinctions between 
specific types of institutional voids and their consequences for firms and economies.  
Our findings indicate that we should exercise caution in drawing broad conclusions 
regarding institutional development and affiliate performance. Figure 1, which combines insights 
from our jurisdiction-level HOMA and MARA analyses (Tables 3 and 4), testifies to the need for 
further middle-range theorizing. Its horizontal axis was computed by transforming the scores of a 
given country on all statistically significant variables capturing institutional voids (Table 4) to z-
scores, and then adding and averaging them, such that we obtain a scaled measure of institutional 
development ranging from near-perfect development (left) to grave voids (right). The vertical 
axis shows the country-specific mean effect sizes we retrieved (Table 3), ranging from 
substantial affiliate underperformance (bottom) to outperformance (top). The figure also portrays 
a best-fitting line, showing the general tendencies flowing from the empirical observations, 
obtained by regressing country-specific mean effect sizes on the first, second, third, and fourth 
power terms of these countries’ institutional development scores. It shows that the institutional 
voids thesis as it is conventionally stated is only applicable to the nations in the right-upper 
quadrant (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey), where group membership compensates for missing 
institutions, and the left-lower quadrant (e.g., Belgium, France, and Japan), where affiliates 
suffer from the conglomerate discount that is commonly observed in developed nations (Khanna 
& Palepu, 1997). However, the nations in the remaining two quadrants present some enigmatic 
questions for institutional voids theorists. Why do BG members do so well relative to 
unaffiliated firms in contexts with generally well-functioning institutions, like Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Sweden? And why do they do so unexpectedly poorly in contexts with severe 
voids, like Nigeria, Pakistan, and Peru? Additional studies are needed to explore why these 
outliers are so poorly explained by extant institutional voids theory, and to reveal which 
institutional variables are responsible for their counter-theorized positioning. 
Strategic Choices and Affiliate Performance 
Given the mixed and contingent findings of empirical research on the affiliation-performance 
link (cf. Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Hypotheses1a and 1b), it is surprising that little prior research 
has examined the influence on this relationship of affiliate-level strategic processes. As noted 
above, only a few studies have explored how affiliation affects the strategic choices that firms 
make (e.g. Kim et al., 2004), and no prior work has explicitly evaluated the extent to which such 
choices mediate the focal relationship. On this point, our findings indicate that greater financial 
leverage and more diversified product market strategies are pathways associated with lower 
performance among BG affiliates. As both high levels of leverage and diversification are 
suggestive of pyramiding and tunneling behavior (cf. Morck & Yeung, 2003; Mitton, 2002), 
which results in the inefficient allocation of resources (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000), our findings 
are supportive of agency-theoretic perspectives on BGs, at least for affiliates that are on the high 
end of the leverage and diversification distributions. On the other hand, the application of other 
theoretical perspectives, such as the RBV (cf. Guillén, 2000) and the institutional voids thesis (cf. 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000b), may be necessary to explain affiliation-strategy-performance 
dynamics among affiliates with moderate to low leverage and diversification levels.  
More generally, our findings are suggestive of an important role played by affiliate-level 
strategic choice in the affiliation-performance link. However, due to the scarcity of strategy 
variables in the body of primary empirical BG studies, we have been unable to evaluate a more 
comprehensive set of potential strategy mediators. We view this gap in the body of empirical 
research as an area of great opportunity for BG scholars. Our leverage and diversification 
findings provide evidence that certain strategic choices represent pathways through which BG 
affiliation can harm firm performance. On the other hand, given the evidence that many firms 
benefit from BG affiliation, there should also be other strategic choice pathways which lead to 
improved performance levels. Accordingly, we call for future research directed towards 
identifying those specific types of strategies and competence-building activities associated with 
superior performance among BG affiliates and reason that frameworks and hypotheses drawn 
from multiple theoretical perspectives represent a logical point of departure for such inquiries.  
 
Group-Level Size Effects: Scale and Scope Both Matter (Differently) 
Our results on the effects of BG size on group-level performance highlight a salient distinction 
between the related effects of group scale (Hypothesis 4a) and scope (Hypothesis 4b). In this 
regard, we find that scope mediates the relationship between group-level scale and performance. 
More specifically, we find that while the direct effect of scale is strongly positive, scale also 
tends to increase the operational scope of BGs and that such scope actually counteracts some of 
the performance-enhancing benefits of scale.  
In terms of their relevance to alternative theoretical accounts of the size-performance 
relationship, these findings support views that size affords performance-enhancing benefits 
related to economies of scale in central management functions (e.g. Amsden & Hikino, 1994), 
reputation benefits (e.g. Morck et al., 2005), and the accumulation of market and political power 
(e.g. Claessens et al. 2000; Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). On the other hand, we find no benefits 
associated with scope, such as those suggested by Khanna and Palepu (1997), Chang and Hong 
(2000), and others. On the contrary, our results support the findings of Hoskisson, Johnson, 
Tihanyi and White (2005), who highlight the bureaucratic and other costs of managing widely 
diversified BGs. Thus, while some researchers (e.g. Khanna & Palepu, 1997) have argued that 
greater scope benefits BGs as it allows them to fill institutional voids in emerging economies, 
our findings indicate that the capacity to fill such voids through increased scope is not without 
concomitant costs (cf. Hoskisson et al., 2005). Viewed in this light, the evident scope of many 
BGs is better described as a cost of doing business in their institutional contexts, rather than as a 
source of competitive advantage in its own right.  
More generally, our findings concerning the contrasting effects of scale and scope 
suggest that the relationship between group size and performance is complex. That is, rather than 
being singular in nature, size consists of multiple contrasting effects. Like other findings reported 
earlier, these results point to the need for researchers, practitioners and policy makers to adopt 
theories and methodologies which allow them to make sufficiently fine-grained distinctions to 
capture the complex associations that underlie BG performance characteristics. In this respect, 
our findings highlight the need for BG researchers to distinguish between the effects of scale and 
scope both conceptually and empirically. Future research exploring how BG executives manage 
the complex trade-offs between scale benefits and scope costs and the effects such choices have 
on their group’s competence building and developmental trajectories can yield important new 
insights regarding the performance characteristics of this important organizational form.   
 
 Limitations 
While the various meta-analytical techniques we employed have allowed us to address several 
previously untested research questions, our study also has two limitations that can only be 
remedied by means of future primary BG studies. A first limitation is that while we have been 
able to identify mediating roles for variables like diversification and leverage at both the affiliate 
and group-levels of analysis, data limitations prevented us from exploring any cross-level 
interactions involving these variables. Future primary studies are needed, for example, to test 
whether group-level diversification leads to more focus amongst affiliates due to the intent of 
avoiding competition between affiliates (Gerlach, 1992), or to more affiliate-level diversification 
due to pyramiding and tunneling behavior (Morck & Yeung, 2003).  
A second limitation of our study design is that meta-analyses do not allow for modeling 
the influence of time, except in a crude way as a moderator of the focal effect (Coombs et al., 
2010) as we have done in our MARA analyses. Additional primary longitudinal studies are 
therefore needed to capture more nuanced time-dependent performance effects of BG affiliation. 
For instance, several authors have suggested the hypothesis that the benefits of affiliation 
decrease over time, as the gradual filling of institutional voids by BGs creates positive 
externalities which erode the originating benefits of affiliation (Carney, Shapiro, & Tang, 2009) 
 
Conclusion 
BGs come in many shapes and sizes and their heterogeneity across time and place defies any 
simple explanation. So what should one conclude? On the evidence assembled in this paper, we 
conclude that highly polarized characterizations of BGs as either heroic paragons or as villainous 
robber barons are unwarranted and unproductive. Historical accounts tell us that their emergence 
and early establishment often occurred under very difficult institutional conditions and that they 
played a pivotal role in the early stages of many a country or region’s economic development 
(Carney & Gedajlovic, 2002; Gerlach, 1992; Keister, 1998). These descriptions indicate that BGs 
are complex social and economic phenomena serving diverse purposes (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 
Yiu et al., 2007). As a result, BGs are likely to have multiple, conflicting, and complementary 
effects on their host societies and the firms that affiliate with them. We should then eschew 
mono-theoretical accounts which characterize BGs in singular terms, such as an internal capital 
market, an extraction device for wealthy families, or a generalized response to chronic 
institutional failure, since they will likely divert attention away from their evident structural and 
strategic complexity and the kinds of performance they can attain. More productive in our view 
is research that employs insights from multiple theoretical streams and is attuned theoretically 
and methodologically to the complex tensions embodied in BGs. Thus, the development of 
appropriately nuanced theories and methodologies is both the challenge and opportunity for 
future research on this important and multifaceted organizational form. 
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k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; mean ρ = estimate of population correlation; SDρ = standard 
deviation of mean ρ; CImean ρ 95% = 95 percent confidence interval for mean ρ; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test 
statistic; p = probability of Q; I
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 = scale-free index of heterogeneity. 
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-0.02* 0.01 -0.04 / -0.01 5,805.29 (0.00) 0.95 
Accounting measures 201 672,765 -0.03* 0.01 -0.04 / -0.02 4,687.64 (0.00) 0.96 
Market measures 83 159,042 
 
-0.01 0.01 -0.03 / 0.01 954.16 (0.00) 0.48 
TABLE 2 




k = number of effect sizes; N = total sample size; mean ρ = estimate of population correlation; SDρ = standard 
deviation of mean ρ; CImean ρ 95% = 95 percent confidence interval for mean ρ; Q = Cochran’s homogeneity test 
statistic; p = probability of Q; I
2
 = scale-free index of heterogeneity. 
b





















Predictor K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test I
2
 
Business group affiliation to firm 
performance 
50 52,146 -0.02* 0.01 -0.04 / -0.00 252.36 (0.00) 0.80 
Accounting measures 27 24,143 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 / 0.01 126.24 (0.00) 0.79 
Market measures 23 28,003 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 / 0.02 106.38 (0.00) 0.78 
        
TABLE 3 
 





 Mean effect sizes marked with an asterix (*) are statistically significant (p < .05). 
 
Country % of BGs aff. K N Mean SDρ CI 95% Q test 
Argentina 0.51 1 129 -0.28    
Belgium 0.09 4 20,033 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 / 0.03 59.48 (0.00) 
Brazil 0.48 1 629 0.08    
Bulgaria 0.13 1 114 -0.05    
Chile 0.47 10 9,633 0.07* 0.03 0.02 / 0.12 45.79 (0.00) 
China 0.66 14 8,402 0.01 0.03 -0.03 / 0.07 76.01 (0.00) 
Colombia 0.50 3 1,238 0.05* 0.02 0.00 / 0.09 1.67 (0.43) 
France 0.38 2 3,041 -0.05* 0.02 -0.09 / -0.01 1.16 (0.28) 
Hong Kong 0.20 9 14,488 0.03* 0.01 0.01 / 0.05 12.05 (0.15) 
India 0.43 21 89,380 0.02 0.02 -0.01 / 0.06 434.19 (0.00) 
Indonesia 0.29 3 3,674 0.04* 0.02 0.00 / 0.08 2.63 (0.26) 
Israel 0.33 1 86 -0.01    
Japan 0.41 87 402,257 -0.07* 0.01 -0.09 / -0.06 1,548.03 (0.00) 
Malaysia 0.43 1 121 0.14    
Mexico 0.32 1 344 0.06    
Nigeria  2 186 -0.21* 0.07 -0.36 / -0.07 0.00 (0.99) 
Pakistan 0.52 3 498 -0.23* 0.04 -0.32 / -0.14 0.41 (0.81) 
Peru 0.26 1 99 -0.17    
Philippines 0.37 4 624 0.10 0.06 -0.01 / 0.23 6.38 (0.09) 
Russia 0.29 9 1,409 -0.00 0.04 -0.09 / 0.08 11.08 (0.20) 
Singapore 0.69 1 71 0.23    
South Africa 0.49 1 1,071 -0.02    
South Korea  0.19 56 240,115 -0.02* 0.01 -0.05 / -0.00 1,392.11 (0.00) 
Sweden  4 296 0.17* 0.06 0.05 / 0.28 1.53 (0.67) 
Taiwan 0.48 15 13,599 -0.00 0.03 -0.06 / 0.06 152.67 (0.00) 
Thailand 0.60 3 1,755 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 / 0.03 2.26 (0.32) 
Turkey 0.55 11 2,259 0.06* 0.02 0.02 / 0.10   8.68 (0.56) 
TABLE 4 
 





































 Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented for study moderators and substantive moderators with 
standard errors in parentheses. k is the total number of effect sizes; Q is the homogeneity statistic with its probability 
in parentheses; v is the random effects variance component.   
b
 These control variables could not be included in Model 2 because of collinearity issues. 
*    p < .1 
**  p < .05 
***  p < .01 
 






Constant -0.03 (0.01)** -0.03 (0.02)* -0.04 (0.02)** 
    
Financial infrastructure    
Stock market capitalization   -0.06 (0.02)*** 
Debt availability   -0.01 (0.00)** 
    
Legal institutions    
Rule of law   0.06 (0.03)* 
Anti-self dealing index   -0.13 (0.10) 
Enforcing contracts   0.00 (0.00) 
    
Labor market institutions    
General education level   -0.02 (0.01)** 
Business school count   -0.02 (0.01)*** 
Quality of business schools   -0.02 (0.01)* 
Labor market competiveness   0.04 (0.04) 
    
Controls    
Published study  -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Cross-sectional design  0.02 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.01) 
Median year sampling window  -0.00 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00)** 
Journal impact factor  -0.01 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)** 
Physical infrastructure   0.06 (0.05) 
Japan dummy
b
   -0.10 (0.03)*** 
Same data control
b
 Yes Yes No 
    
R
2
 0.34 0.35 0.28 
K 284 284 263 
 QModel (p) 127.50 (0.00) 131.36 (0.00) 103.46 (0.00) 
QResidual (p) 252.03 (0.47) 243.21 (0.56) 264.34 (0.21) 
V 0.005 0.005 0.00434 
z-test -1.28 (p > 0.1) -1.44 (p > 0.1)  
TABLE 5 
 




 Cells below the diagonal contain mean correlations (mean ρ) and standard deviations (s.d.ρ). Cells above the diagonal contain the total number of observations 













Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1.Business group affiliation  13,914 (6) 754,005 (164) 61,473 (44) 79,801 (30) 309,545 (78) 54,380 (30) 173,171 (39) 831,807 (284) 
2. Firm age -0.00 (0.02)  9,058 (4) 2,127 (2) 6,073 (2) 7,044 (3) 1,314 (1) 13,101 (5) 4,658 (3) 
3. Firm size 0.26 (0.02) 0.09 (0.11)  14,835 (15) 81,534 (30) 167,529 (51) 38,012 (15) 67,308 (31) 247,693 (118) 
4.Diversification 0.09 (0.01) -0.13 (0.20) 0.13 (0.06)  609 (4) 6,792 (5) 2,121 (4) 7,355 (4) 20,317 (14) 
5. Internationalization  -0.01 (0.02) 0.06 (0.05) 0.29 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06)  56,956 (7) 5,655 (5) 29,310 (18) 67,080 (19) 
6. Leverage 0.06 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) 0.07 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02)  18,828 (13) 67,466 (15) 192,874 (65) 
7. Risk -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 -0.19 (0.05) -0.04 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.18 (0.03)  10,562 (5) 49,860 (21) 
8. R&D 0.04 (0.01) -0.01 (0.03) 0.14 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.17 (0.03) -0.00 (0.02) 0.05 (0.05)  57,505 (23) 






Diversification Internationalization Leverage Performance 
Business group affiliation 0.06 (4.70) -0.09 (-7.73) 0.05 (3.72) -0.01 (-1.06) 
Firm size 0.13 (10.55) 0.31 (26.35) 0.05 (4.46)  
Firm age -0.14 (-12.08) 0.03 (2.81) 0.04 (2.94)  
     
Risk    -0.12 (-10.62) 
R&D    0.06 (4.87) 
     
Diversification    -0.05 (-3.84) 
Internationalization     0.01 (0.53) 
Leverage    -0.12 (-9.98) 
     
     
Harmonic mean N 7,065    
X
2
 760.09    
GFI 0.98    
RMSR 0.098    
 
a









Group-Level Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix
a 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Business group scale   23,436 (22) 27,124 (3) 42,817 (18) 23,064 (23) 73,326 (71) 
2. Business group scope  0.47 (0.05)  31,206 (7) 33,029 (16) 5,672 (24) 38,495 (77) 
3. R&D  0.25 (0.06) 0.04 (0.04)  52,200 (6) 3,086 (1) 37,627 (7) 
4. Leverage  -0.07 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.01)  12,366 (9) 62,646 (29) 
5. Risk  -0.12 (0.02) -0.04 (0.01) -0.04 0.25 (0.04)  38,266 (44) 
6. Performance  0.07 (0.02) -0.08 (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) -0.19 (0.03) -0.26 (0.03)  
a
 Cells below the diagonal contain mean correlations (mean ρ) and standard deviations (s.d.ρ). Cells above 
the diagonal contain the total number of observations (N) and number of samples (k). Bold font indicates a 


































Business group scope Performance 
Business group scale 0.47 (68.08) 0.09 (10.53) 
   
Business group scope  -0.13 (-15.62) 
Leverage  -0.13 (-16.45) 
R&D  0.02 (2.58) 
Risk  -0.22 (-28.79) 
Harmonic mean N 16,353  
X
2
 172.10 (0.00)  
GFI 0.99  
RMSR 0.02  
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